On April 20, 2010, the blowout of the Macondo well resulted in explosions and an uncontrollable fire onboard the Deepwater Horizon. Eleven people lost their lives, 17 were seriously injured, and 115 of the 126 onboard evacuated. The Deepwater Horizon sank 36 hours later, and the Macondo well discharged hydrocarbons into the Gulf of Mexico for nearly three months before it was contained.
Transocean was contracted by BP Exploration & Production Inc. (BP) to provide the Deepwater Horizon rig and personnel to drill the Macondo well on Mississippi Canyon Block 252. Drilling started on February 11, 2010, and was completed on April 9, 2010.
Immediately following the incident ENGINEERING SERVICES LP was contacted by the U. S. House Energy and Commerce Committee under the leadership of Chairman Henry Waxman of California and Bart Stupak, Michigan. We were requested to help the committee understand the nature of the incident and to provide them guidance in developing their questions for BP's CEO, Tony Hayward. The effort we expended to help the committee was driven by the need to protect the industry from misunderstandings and lack of knowledge. The assistance we provided to the Committee was done pro bono. In a very short period of time with very little information, we analyzed the available facts and information surrounding the incident to accurately determine the immediate nature of the incident.
Subsequently, the Committee requested that the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigate the cause of the blowout of the Macondo well. ENGINEERING SERVICES, LP was made aware of the requested and contacted the CSB for an opportunity to provide a bid to perform the investigation. We were the successful bidder and were contracted by the CSB to participate in the root cause failure analysis of the BOP (blowout preventer).
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Engineering Services, LP, Gordon Aaker news/videos/articles on various topics below:
AUGUST 2, 2011
REMAPPING DEBATE
Poorly maintained gas pipelines put increasing numbers at risk
Shutting down a pipeline for repairs or replacement is costly, so pipeline owners prefer a different approach as corrosion eats through pipeline walls and water, earth movements, and “dings” from earth moving equipment damage exterior walls and welds. The pipeline companies just reduce the pressure in the pipeline, explained Gordon Allen Aaker, Jr., a pipeline engineer in Kingwood, Tex., who consults on safety issues to both pipeline companies and those who sue them. Read full story » Top
JULY 18, 2011
HOUSTON CHRONICLE
Spill it
What went wrong before last April's deep-water disaster? Problem with the blowout preventer?
It shouldn't be a secret
And why didn't a component called the "upper annular" seal around the drill pipe? "That, ultimately, is why [11 men] died," explained failure analyst Gordon Aaker, of Kingwood-based Engineering Services. "If that thing had closed, it would have saved lives." Read full story » Top
JULY 11, 2011
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, HEARST Newspapers
Questions raised about Deepwater Horizon equipment
Second round of testing on equipment was open only to feds.
WASHINGTON - A government-run examination of the device ended in March, and a second round of testing was open only to the Justice Department, the oil spill victims and the three companies connected to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
“It's only fair to the industry that they know what happened,” said Gordon Aaker, president of Kingwood-based Engineering Services.
He said too many questions about the Macondo blowout preventer remain for the companies that use similar devices to be confident of avoiding a repeat of the April 20, 2010, disaster.
Engineering Services took part in a four-month government-led examination of the blowout preventer, or BOP, on behalf of the Chemical Safety Board, an independent agency that also is probing the disaster.
That probe was meant to aid a federal investigation into the root cause of the explosion that killed 11 workers and the resulting oil spill that dumped 4.9 million barrels of crude into the Gulf last year. Read full story » Top
JULY 11, 2011
HOUSTON CHRONICLE
As BP gets closer to sealing leaking well, the stakes get higher
Teams of engineers have been holed up for weeks in two conference rooms, one for each relief well, at the west Houston BP offices. Cloistered on the second floor of a building called Westlake 4, apart from the main spill crisis center on the floor above, they see every nugget of data from the wells in real time, and they're in constant communication with offshore teams running the controls. Even the smallest decisions are reviewed by BP and other technical specialists. Read full story » Top
OCTOBER 26, 2010 (Original Air Date)
PBS: FRONTLINE | The Spill
FRONTLINE and ProPublica investigate the long and troubled history of the oil giant, BP
Chapter 5 of 6 "Deeper Waters...Bigger Risks"
Transcript:
GORDON AAKER, Mechanical Engineering Consultant:
“The storm is not really the cause of why that thing almost flipped, it's because the check valve was installed backwards, OK? And all that was probably caused by being in a hurry and not dotting their I's and crossing their T's in this case.” Top
OCTOBER 26, 2010 (Original Air Date)
PBS: FRONTLINE | The Spill
FRONTLINE and ProPublica investigate the long and troubled history of the oil giant, BP
Chapter 6 of 6 "The Well from Hell"
Transcript:
GORDON AAKER, Mechanical Engineering Consultant:
“Every indication was that the well that blew out was already $10 million over. And to get caught doing a remedial cement job, and going back in there and doing all this work, was another $10 million. And that was going to impact them. So they were cutting corners on an operations side, trying to get by with less.” Top
JULY 12, 2010
THE NEW YORK TIMES
In BP's Record, a History of Boldness and Costly Blunders
“It could have been catastrophic,” said Gordon A. Aaker Jr., a senior engineering consultant on the project. “You would have lost a lot of oil a mile down before you would have even known. It could have been a helluva spill — much like the Deepwater Horizon.” Read full story » Top
JULY 1, 2010
BLOOMBERG
BP Criminal Case in Oil Spill May Be Inevitable, Analysts Say
Gordon Aaker Jr., an engineering consultant hired to advise the House committee, called the failure to test the cement bond “horribly negligent.” BP spokesman Scott Dean declined to comment, saying the company isn’t talking about pending litigation. Read full story » Top
JUNE 16, 2010
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Congress to Scrutinize Safety on Another BP Rig
Atlantis critics argue that such "as-built" drawings are particularly important for undersea components since those parts can't readily be observed by the eye. Without such drawings, "you don't know what you've got," said Gordon Aaker, Jr., of Engineering Services, a Houston engineering and consulting firm, who has worked with Mr. Abbott on his complaints and is helping congressional investigators on the Deepwater Horizon accident. Read full story » Top
June 15, 2010
USA TODAY
Papers charge BP cut corners while constructing oil well
Oil drilling consultant Gordon Aaker told committee investigators BP's decision was "unheard of" and "horribly negligent," said the letter to BP CEO Tony Hayward, who will testify before the committee Thursday. Read full story » Top
JUNE 14, 2010
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Text of letter to BP CEO Tony Hayward outlining congressional investigators' findings
Page 11:
The Committee staff asked an independent engineer with expertise in the analysis of well failure about BP’s decision not to conduct a cement bond log. The engineer, Gordon Aaker, Jr., P.E., a Failure Analysis Consultant with the firm Engineering Services, LLP, said that it was “unheard of” not to perform a cement bond log on a well using a single casing approach, and he described BP’s decision not to conduct a cement bond log as “horribly negligent.” Another independent expert consulted by the Committee, John Martinez, P.E., told the committee that “cement bond or cement evaluation logs should always be used on the production string.”
Ed Schultz and panel debate whether BP will actually cover the cost of the oil disaster in the Gulf like they claim. Gordon Aaker of Engineering Services , LP gives his engineering evaluation and failure analysis. Watch Video » Top
September 23, 2004
WIKIPEDIA
THUNDER HORSE OIL FIELD
The rig's design engineer, Gordon Aaker, said that the cracked manifold could have caused a catastrophic oil spill. Read full story » Top
2004 - 2005
WORLD NEWS
THUNDER HORSE PDQ
Thunder Horse & Blue MarlinVideos
Thunder Horse PDQ was evacuated with the approach of Hurricane Dennis in July 2005. After the hurricane passed, the platform fell into a 20 degree list and was in danger of foundering.
The platform was designed for a 100 year event, and inspection teams found no hull damage, and no water was taken on from a leak through its hull. Rather, an incorrectly plumbed 6-inch length of pipe allowed water to flow freely among several ballast tanks that set forth a chain of events causing the platform to tip into the water. The platform was fully righted about a week after Dennis, delaying commercial production initially scheduled for late 2005. During repairs, it was discovered that the underwater manifold was severely cracked due to poorly welded pipes. The rig's design engineer, Gordon Aaker, said that the cracked manifold could have caused a catastrophic oil spill.
The platform took a nearly direct hit six weeks later from Hurricane Katrina, but was undamaged.
Read full story » Top
